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Moving forward on listing reform 
 
 
Syren Johnstone*, Nigel Davis** & Douglas W. Arner*** 
Asian Institute of International Financial Law 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the process of listing reform in Hong Kong. It identifies the 
primary underlying threads in that process as undertaken to date and queries 
whether the overarching strategic objectives for market development have been 
adequately diagnosed. Exchanges compete on a range of factors that are 
influenced by both public and private interests, which requires a clear policy 
analysis of developmental objectives as a precursor to regulatory reform 
proposals. Three Propositions are derived that may assist to reposition the reform 
debate. It is suggested that if stakeholders take these Propositions on board in 
earnest, there will be a better prospect for moving forward together on listing 
reform. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Successful market reform requires a dynamic balance between cooperation and 
challenge that evolves in response to two important sets of considerations. The 
first is the extant commercial, legal and practical constraints. The second is an 
objective and encompassing assessment of the strategic opportunities and risks 
presented by pursuing or not pursuing a course of reform that takes into account 
the interests of all stakeholders in the market. Whereas the former may tend 
toward intertia, the latter requires an enabling action.  
 
Hong Kong’s dual responsibilities model (DRM) of listing regulation requires this 
balance to be presided over by the SFC and HKEX1 and subjected to the litmus 
test of the market. The DRM operates at the 2nd and 3rd tiers of the regulatory 
hierarchy and is ultimately subject to the top-tier, being the Hong Kong 
Government, which is responsible for the legislation that enables the SFC’s and 
HKEX’s undertakings, namely the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO). 
 
The first part of this paper briefly considers the recent steps taken by the SFC 
and the HKEX to reform the governance structure of listing regulation. The 
second part sets the recent steps in the context of a debate that has been 
ongoing since prior to the introduction of the SFO. Analysis indicates the recent 
steps have failed to successfully move the debate on listing reform forward from 
a repeating set of essentially unchanged issues around which the Hong Kong 
market has been circling for over 15 years.  
 
The final part builds on the foregoing critique. It identifies common threads in the 	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1 Respectively, the Securities and Futures Commission, and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited 
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ongoing debate that amount to problems in need of better management, and 
uses the most recent SFC and HKEX proposals as illustrations. It is suggested 
that the debate needs to be more clearly refocussed on identifying underlying 
strategic objectives of market development. If real and progressive reform 
reaches a stalemate at the level of the 2nd and 3rd tiers of Hong Kong’s regulatory 
architecture, the wider economic and social interests in Hong Kong’s capital 
market may become relevant to consider, which may necessitate a firmer top-
down policy direction from the 1st tier of the regulatory hierarchy, the Hong Kong 
Government. The paper concludes by advancing three Propositions for redirecting 
the debate on listing reform. 
 
1. Recent steps 
 
The SFC/HKEX joint consultation commenced in June 20162  (Consultation Paper) 
is part of an ongoing effort to keep Hong Kong’s market competitive, which we 
applaud. Unfortunately, that consultation met with fundamental difficulties as 
regards market acceptance, including among the SEHK’s3 own Listing Committee 
(LC),4 and as regards its legal viability,5 a concern that had been raised in the 
Financial Affairs Panel of the Legislative Council.6  
 
The recent SFC/HKEX conclusions paper issued in September 20177 (Conclusions) 
is not itself without problems. This section briefly identifies four primary concerns 
arising out of the newly proposed Listing Policy Panel (LPP) in the context of 
current regulatory architecture. This will be connected to the historical 
development in the second section and to the question of market development in 
the final section of this paper. 
 
First, the proposed LPP is to have “advisory, consultative and steering”8 functions 
that are active, operative and mandatory, and interact with the undertaking of 
statutory functions. These functions are required to be invoked by the SEHK’s 
Listing Department (LD) from an early stage of it undertaking its statutory 
function of formulating proposed listing rules. The LD is subsequently required to 
take into account the LPP’s recommendations.9 Proposals in which the LPP have 
an interest are to be presented to the LC, and subsequently the SEHK’s Board 
and the SFC together with the LPP’s written views.10 While such recommendations 
are not intended to be binding on the SFC, the HKEX or the LC,11 it has previously 
been pointed out that the SFC’s “negative control” and  “looming control”12 may, 
de facto, come to bear considerable influence over the undertaking of statutory 
functions. This is particularly the case now that the SFC has adopted its front-
loaded approach that signals a greater involvement in listing matters traditionally 
reserved to the SEHK.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Joint consultation paper - proposed enhancements to The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited’s 
decision-making and governance structure for listing regulation” SFC/HKEX, June 2016 
3 The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 
4 Listing Committee submission 2016 (undated); Submission by three Listing Committee members 
dated 16 November 2016 
5 S Johntone, N Davis and DW Arner “A principles-based response to the proposed reform of the 
governance structure for listing regulation in Hong Kong”, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law 
Research Paper No. 2016/036 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2867895 
6 Policy briefing cum meeting of Panel on Financial Affairs on 6 February 2017 
7 “Joint consultation conclusions. Proposed enhancements to The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
Limited’s decision-making and governance structure for listing regulation” SFC/HKEX, September 
2017  
8 Conclusions para 6; SFC press release dated 15 September 2017 
9 Conclusions para 59(c) 
10 Conclusions para 59(d) 
11 Conclusions para 59(b) 
12 Johnstone, Davis and Arner, op. cit. pp 14-15 
	   Johnstone, Davis & Arner             p. 3 / 15	  
How the influence of the LPP will develop over time is hard to predict, however, to 
the extent that its steerage of policy serves a purpose and is effective (and 
possibly compelling) there is a risk that other problems may emerge.13 Although 
the LPP would be concerned with “listing policy with broader regulatory or market 
implications”,14 “policy” is nevertheless capable of wide interpretation, ranging 
from very broad principles to more specific constraints on detailed rule making. 
For example, a policy that allowed weighted voting rights (WVR) could be 
expressed generally, or expressed at the level of specific requirements such as 
anti-avoidance measures, sunset clauses, etc. “Policy” could also be interpreted 
to refer to the application of existing rules - the dynamic and innovative nature of 
the market means that the SEHK cum LC is constantly being required to develop 
policies on how to apply existing rules to novel circumstances. Where in this 
spectrum the LPP’s policy steerage mandate is intended to settle, or where it 
might eventually settle, is not known, leaving the LPP conceptually vague and at 
risk of undermining the authority and policy-making role of the LC. 
 
Second, the LPP, which replaces the LPC concept proposed under the Consultation 
Paper, is a “body”15 established “outside”16 of the SFC and HKEX. Although it will 
be consituted by memorandum of understanding (MoU) arrangements between 
the SFC and the HKEX,17 the LPP possesses a separate identity with specific roles 
that appear to go beyond merely inter-regulator co-operation and assistance. As 
such, this makes the LPP a curious entity that sits outside Hong Kong’s existing 
regulatory architecture, despite its involvement in regulatory functions. Although 
the LPP will operate pursuant to terms of reference, 18  these can only be 
operational as there are no legal mechanisms for accountability, oversight or 
transparency in its undertaking. While the SFC does have the power to form 
committees,19 establish subsidiaries20 and enter into MoUs with other regulatory 
bodies,21 it is currently unclear on what basis it would have any power to form or 
oversee a body such as the LPP.22 By way of comparison, the LC was established 
pursuant to an SFC-HKEX MoU as a sub-committee of the SEHK’s board thus 
giving it a firm legal basis for its existence and its functions. The curious 
character of the LPP also gives rise to other unaddressed problems. For example, 
while LPP members may seek the views of their respective organisations,23 it is 
unclear how the secrecy provisions of the SFO24 to which the SFC is subject will 
operate. It would also be necessary for the SFC to install internal conflict of 
interest rules that are consistent with best practices globally. 
 
Third, there is some consternation in the market that the Consultation Paper has 
been followed by the Conclusions, which present a new proposal as a fait 
accompli without regard to the usual consultation process. While the SFC is not 
statutorily required to undertake a public consultation in the present 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Such as the risk that the LPP could be considered a shadow director of important regulatory 
functions of the LD/Exchange. See Johnstone, Davis and Arner, op cot section 6.2 to 6.3 
14 Conclusions para 6 
15 Conclusions para 6 and 59(a); SFC press release dated 15 September 2017 
16 Conclusions Appendix 1; SFC press release dated 15 September 2017 
17 Conclusions para 59(a) 
18 Conclusions para 7 refers to “how meetings are convened, how they are conducted and how 
frequently they are held” 
19 s. 8 SFO 
20 s. 5(4)(da) SFO 
21 s. 5(1)(h) & 5(4)(b) SFO 
22 The SFC does have wide powers “to take such steps” etc (s.5(1)(a) SFO) but it is doubtful whether 
that is specific enough to permit the creation of a body outside the SFC. Section 5(1)(o) SFO allows 
the SFC “to take appropriate steps in relation to the securities and futures industry further to any 
requirement of the Financial Secretary” etc but the FS has not made any such requirement here 
23  Conclusions para 10 
24 s. 378 SFO. It is unclear whether the LPP is able to be regarded as a “specified person”,  for 
example, under s. 378(15)(c)(iii) SFO 
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circumstances, its policy, which has been fully vetted in 2002-2003 by the 
Process Review Panel,25 is that it will dispense with public consultation only in 
very limited circumstances, such as where the proposed changes are “minor and 
uncontroversial or where a delay in implementing a proposal would not be in the 
interest of the investing public or the public interest”.26 The Conclusions therefore 
sits very uncomfortably with the context of the Consultation Paper having 
provoked a public response unprecedented in size in Hong Kong’s regulatory 
history. 
 
Finally, it is unclear what benefits the LPP would bring over and above the 
existing “High-Level Group” (HLG) already established by the SFC and the SEHK 
pursuant to their 2003 memorandum,27 or in what ways the HLG has or has not 
been effective in fostering policy development. At the time the HLG was 
established, it was to “strengthen the understanding and communication between” 
the SFC and the HKEX.28  Whether that has worked would appear to warrant 
assessment, which would require further elaboration as to what the HLG has 
engaged in or advised on and the level of influence it exercises over regulatory 
concerns, such as the functions of the LC. It is also unclear whether the LPP is 
intended as a formalization of the HLG, or if the HLG would cease to operate. 
 
2. How did we get here 
 
The DRM of regulating Hong Kong’s listed market represents one type of 
competitive self-regulation.29 It rests on the premise that the SEHK via the 
functionality of the LC understands the problems in the market and how to fix 
them better than government or statutory regulatory agencies such as the SFC. 
Over the past thirty years, three important historical reconstructions of this 
model are: 
 
(1) the government-initiated Hay Davison Report in 1988, which came down in 
favour of continued practitioner regulation subject to safeguards;30  
 
(2) the introduction of the SMLR31 and dual filing regime (DFR) concurrently with 
the SFO becoming effective in 2003, which gave the SFC a measure of oversight 
of listing applications and listed issuers; and  
 
(3) a set of public consultations and reviews circa the introduction of the SFO 
undertaken at the initiative of the Financial Secretary (FS) and the FSTB,32 
particularly (a) the report of the Expert Group33 in 2003 in response to the 
creation in the UK of a listing authority within the regulatory functions of the FSA 
(now the FCA),34 and (b) the FSTB’s 2003-2005 consultations on the regulation of 
listing and scope of the SFC’s roles and powers.35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 An independent body appointed by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region to review the SFC's internal procedures 
26 http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-sfc/our-role/how-we-function/public-consultation.html (last 
visited 25 September 2017) 
27 “Memorandum of understanding governing listing matters”, SFC and SEHK, 28 January 2003, para 
5.1 
28 Per Andrew Sheng, Chairman of the SFC, SFC and HKEX joint press release 28 January 2003 
29 See Antony Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, (1995) OJLS 97, at 103 
30 “The operation and regulation of the Hong Kong Securities Industry”, Report of the Securities 
Review Committee, May 1988 
31 Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules, cap. 571V 
32 Financial Services Treasury Bureau 
33 Report by the Expert Group to Review the Operation of the Securities and Futures  
Market Regulatory Structure, March 2003 
34 Respectively, the Financial Services Authority, and the Financial Conduct Authority 
35 “Consultation paper on proposals to enhance the regulation of listing”, 3 October 2003; 
“Consultation conclusions on proposals to enhance the regulation of listing”, 26 March 2004; 
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Contemporary discussion in relation to listing reform remains positioned around 
and to a large extent pinioned by these underpinnings of the past three decades. 
That it is so is striking given the significant developments in the Hong Kong 
market in the intervening years including its world ranking in in terms of total 
market capitalization and it frequently being the largest global market for raising 
new capital via IPOs. If taken together with China’s other main equity markets, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, it would be the 2nd largest equity market in the world.36 
The composition of listed issuers has also changed dramatically over this period, 
with a highly significant shift to the listing of Mainland companies such that these 
firms now account for the majority of market capitalisation and trading.37  
 
Yet over the course of these remarkable developments other features of a 
developed international market have failed to emerge. The position of 
shareholders has remained unchanged in relation to shareholder rights and 
remedies despite proposals to develop this area,38 and shareholder activism is 
rare.39 The Hong Kong market remains primarily an equities product market that 
has failed to develop an institutional investor base commensurate with its size, 
although there is some evidence that this is improving in recent years. 40 
Participation of institutional shareholders is usually regarded as enabling greater 
depth in the market in terms of better value-testing in the traded market, 
developing research capabilities among domestic regulated intermediaries, and 
bringing a positive influence on corporate governance. The influence of 
institutional investors is further affected by the fact that around half of all listed 
issuers possess at least one shareholder holding between 30% and 50% of the 
listed capital, with over a third of Main Board issuers having a single majority 
shareholder.41 This failure matters when considered in view of the significantly 
larger population of issuers coming to the market, many of which are smaller-cap 
issuers, most of which are from one jurisdiction still undergoing fundamental 
capital market development, Mainland China, thus presenting limited 
opportunities for the market or its investors to diversify risk. 
 
One consequence of this context is an increased need to ensure the oversight 
mechanisms of the DRM are appropriately empowered. While the SFC is given 
considerable power under the SFO, its powers fall short in various ways of its 
international counterparts, such as the FCA, the SEC and ASIC.42 Although the 
SFC does have power to make subsidiary legislation,43 it is subject to public 
consultation and the negative vetting of the Legislative Council 44  - previous 
attempts to allow the SFC to exercise this power in relation to listing 
requirements that would operate as subsidiary legislation have been strongly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Consultation paper on proposed amendments to the securities and futures ordinance to give 
statutory backing to major listing requirements”, 7 January 2005 
36 Goldman Sachs Research, “China in Transition,” Goldman Sachs, What is Stock Connect, September 
2016: available at Twitter: Goldman Sachs, 7 December 2016 (visited on 13 December 2016). 
37 HKEX, “Our Markets”: available at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/listing/listhk/our_markets.htm 
(visited on 13 December 2016) 
38 For example, the proposal to introduce class action rights (The Law Commission of Hong Kong, 
“Report – Class Actions, (May 2012)” has effectively been set aside by the Department of Justice and 
the HKSAR Government and is no longer listed by the Law Reform Commission as a current project 
(per its website www.hkreform.gov.hk, as of August 2017); “Consultation conclusions on the proposal 
to empower the Securities and Futures Commission to initiate a derivative action on behalf of a 
company”, FSTB, 18  November 2003 
39 The current Elliot and Bank of East Asia case being one of those rare examples 
40 Kieran Colvert, “Where were the Investors?,” (7 April 2015) Chartered Securities Journal 
41 Research in progress pending publication (S. Johnstone). As the research does not take account of 
concert parties or associated holdings, the numbers are in reality much larger 
42 Respectively the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission 
43 For example, under s. 36(1) of the SFO in relation to the listing rules 
44 Section 34 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) 
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rejected. For example, the FSTB’s public consultations sought to expand the dual 
filing regime, a primary objective being to give statutory backing to major 
requirements of the listing rules and expanding the SFC’s powers to encompass 
civil fining and other powers on the primary targets for breaches of the statutory 
listing rules. However, the changes proposed did not proceed. The HKEX’s 
position was (1) the only requirements appropriate to be incorporated into the 
SFO are “the key requirements for the protection of investors and the reputation 
of the market”, (2) the proposed rules lacked the clarity and certainty required of 
legislative provisions, (3) the principle underlying the DRM should be that the 
HKEX “administers and interprets the Listing Rules and the SFC enforces those 
requirements which receive statutory backing”45 and (4) it was the role of the 
legislature, not the SFC, to set out the main requirements and that subsidiary 
legislation falling with the powers of the SFC should be restricted to filling out the 
details.46 To date, only the price-sensitive information provisions of the Listing 
Rules have been given statutory effect through the introduction of Part XIVA SFO 
in 2013. 
 
2.1 Different means of exercising the regulatory mandate 
 
The difficulties in finding pathways for reform that are acceptable to different 
stakeholders has led to the SFC seeking both ex post and ex ante means of 
establishing more effective methods of exercising its overarching regulatory 
mandate.  
 
The SFC has become progressively more active in the courts over the course of 
the last decade in bringing wrongdoing directors and issuers to account via its 
powers under the SFO, 47  culminating in the more recent identification of 
corporate wrongdoing as one of its top enforcement priorities.48 Such actions are 
squarely based in a proper exercise of powers given to it, and are not 
controversial as regards the structural relationship between the HKEX and the 
SFC – the HKEX as a matter of policy recognizes the SFC as a statutory enforcer 
of the law.49  
 
It is generally recognized that the costs of such ex post enforcement are more 
costly to a market than ex ante enforcement50 and the SFC has been pursuing 
two ex ante approaches in recent years to seek to reduce that cost.  
 
First, over the period 2011 to 201351 the SFC laid the groundwork for bringing an 
intensified spotlight on the work of sponsors as an important gateway mechanism 
for ensuring the quality of listed issuers, a thread that runs back to concerns 
expressed in the Hay Davison report. This is entirely consistent with the SFC’s 
role as a regulator of intermediaries. The SFC has laid some emphasis on the 
connection between sub-standard sponsor work and listed company fraud. 52 
However, far less is said about the effect of sub-standard sponsor work on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “Combined Submission of HKEX in Response To The FSTB and SFC Consultation Papers On 
Proposals to Give Statutory Backing To Major Listing Requirements” 24 March 2005, para 1.4-1.5 
46 “Combined Submission of HKEX in Response To The FSTB and SFC Consultation Papers On 
Proposals to Give Statutory Backing To Major Listing Requirements” 24 March 2005, para 1.5(a) 
47 In particular, ss. 212, 213, 214, 277 and Parts XIII and XIVA of the SFO 
48 Per speech of Thomas Atkinson, SFC Executive Director, Enforcement, at the 7th Pan Asian 
Regulatory Summit, 9 November 2016 
49 “Enforcement of the listing rules – policy statement”, HKEX, first issued 13 September 2013, 
revised 17 February 2017 
50 For example, see John Coffee, “Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement” (2007) Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper, No. 304 
51 Particularly the “Report on sponsor theme inspection findings”, SFC, March 2011 and the SFC’s 
“Consultation Conclusions on the regulation of IPO sponsors”, 12 December 2012 
52 Per speech of Thomas Atkinson, SFC Executive Director, Enforcement, at the 8th Pan Asian 
Regulatory Summit, 11 October 2017 
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ability of a viable, non-fraudulent listing applicant to obtain a listing in an efficient 
and predictable manner consistent with international expectations. The reputation 
of the market is negatively affected in both instances. Whereas the former may 
cause investor losses and grabs media headlines, the latter is a more veiled 
danger that may cause lost opportunities or an increased implied cost to the 
issuer of obtaining a listing. The success or failure of the regulatory agencies can 
be separately assessed in relation to each of the foregoing. 
 
Second, more recently, the SFC has signalled a greater preparedness to utilize its 
power under s. 6 SMLR as a means of moving from goalkeeper into the playing 
field53 and placing greater emphasis on earlier, more targeted intervention.54 This 
power has only rarely been used,55 and indeed from the outset of the power 
being given to the SFC it was envisaged that, because the SFC and HKEX would 
be working together to identify serious issues at the beginning of the listing 
application process, “a statutory objection at the end of the process would not 
normally be necessary”.56 The SFC’s present stance has therefore led to concern 
among some market participants that the power may be inconsistent with the 
DRM because it is being used beyond its original purposes as a “reserve power”.57  
 
3. Repositioning the discussion on listing reform 
 
It is clear from the foregoing overview that the current debate over listing reform 
turns on two fundamental questions.  
 
First, what is the proper role of the SFC in relation to the listed market? The 
SFC’s role is at present defined by the SFO and the actions it is permitted or 
expected to engage in. Significant emphasis is typically placed on the SFC’s role 
as an enforcement regulator tasked to protect investors, a role that has been 
reinforced in the Courts.58 However, the debate less commonly finds focus on the 
requirement that, when pursuing its objectives and functions, 59  the SFC is 
statutorily required to have regard to, inter alia, facilitating innovation with 
financial products and the development of Hong Kong as an internationally 
competitive market.60 This implicitly identifies a need for the SFC to balance 
sectoral cum vested interests with the public role of the listed market and to 
recognize broader social interests as a legitimate stakeholder in its 
development.61 To put this another way, any applied interpretation of shareholder 
protection, market integrity and market development must be balanced having 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Per the analogy suggested by Carlson Tong, Chairman of the SFC, as quoted in the South China 
Morning Post, 3rd July, 2016 
54 Per Ashley Alder, SFC CEO, “Front-loaded, transparent and direct: A new approach to regulation for 
changing markets”, speech given at the HKSI Institute Roundtable Luncheon Series”, 13 July 2017. 
Available on the SFC’s website. See also “SFC Regulatory Bulletin: listed corporations” Issue No. 1 
July 2017 
55 In relation to the listing application of China Nonferrous Gold Limited in January 2015. More 
recently, it has used the power in relation to the listing applications of Alpha Era International 
Holdings Limited in July 2017, and Soar Group Holdings Limited in June 2017 (the latter of these was 
appealled but the appeal was subsequently withdrawn – see www.sfat.gov.hk) 
56 “Smooth implementation of dual filing”, SFC, 29 May 2003 
57 See paragraph 28 of the SFC’s A Consultation Paper on the Securities and Futures (Stock Market 
Listing) Rules and the Securities and Futures (Transfer of Functions – Stock Exchange Company) 
Order, May 2002 
58 For example, the SFC’s role “to protect the investing public which is an important objective of the 
SFO” Securities and Futures Commission v. Tiger Asia Management LLC and Others (2012) HKCA 85, 
at para 35 and positioning the SFC as a “protector of the collective interests of the persons dealing in 
the market” Securities and Futures Commission v. Tiger Asia Management LLC and Others (2013) 
HKCFAR 324, at para 16 
59 Ss. 4 & 5 SFO 
60 S. 6(2)(a)&(b) SFO 
61 For a discussion, see: DW Arner, BFC Hsu, SH Goo, S Johnstone and P Lejot “Financial Markets in 
Hong Kong: Law and practice”, OUP, 2016, 10.05-10.11 
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regard to all stakeholder interests in the market.  
 
The foregoing considerations give rise to the second question, whether the SFC’s 
role should develop, and if so how and why? Given that the rule of law is a 
centerpiece of Hong Kong’s system and prevailing culture, any proposal to 
develop the SFC’s role must occur within that framework. In the absence of 
legislative reform, one route would be for the SFC to propose legislation 
subsidiary to the SFO, however, this is not an unfettered power and is in reality 
subject to political influences. Alternatively, one might seek to interpret the law 
to achieve a sought-after objective, however, this should be undertaken with 
considerable caution to preserve the integrity of the regulatory system, its 
transparency and predictability – the latter requirements being particularly 
important to prospective issuers considering Hong Kong as a potential listing 
venue.  
 
It would be a blinkered vision to position specific questions of listing reform as 
being matters of law. Rather, listing reform is ultimately subject to, and driven by, 
an assessment of substantive matters that are essentially value-laden. Among 
others: What development needs are not being met? Who has an interest in such 
development? How urgent or important are these needs as compared to others? 
What are the alternative means of meeting these needs? What are the potential 
outcomes/risks of each alternative? How is the risk of introducing a development 
to be measured against the risk of not doing so?  
 
Identifying the relevant questions and seeking their resolution with a view to 
implementing market development is dependent on some form of consensus 
mechanism between stakeholders. While this may seem an impossible task in a 
factionalized landscape, it is nevertheless essential. It is suggested that there are 
two precursors to consensus. 
 
The first is agreeing a common, objective methodology for assessing reform 
proposals, failing which outcomes will be largely dictated by entrenched positions 
that promote stagnation. For example, should assessment be undertaken on a 
cost-benefit analysis, as is expected of the SEC with regard to proposed changes 
in regulation in the United States? As appealing as that may appear, such 
analyses have significant drawbacks. They are time consuming, expensive to 
undertake and do not always result in an agreed (i.e. unchallenged) outcome.62 
They are normally oriented around a positive proposal to do something, as 
opposed to the potential cost of preserving the status quo through inaction. And 
they ultimately incorporate value-based assessments because they necessarily 
require assumed priorities or objectives. 
 
The second precursor, which therefore accompanies methodology, is establishing 
shared objectives. In the context of the SFC’s role in listing reform, this returns 
one to the issue of balancing protection with development and the question of 
how to define that balance and who should be defining it. 
 
It is useful to cast these somewhat abstract considerations in the context of the 
issues presently being discussed in relation to the market: HKEX’s proposal for a 
New Board (Concept Paper),63 WVR, and the SFC’s front-loaded use of s. 6 SMLR. 
While not seeking to make a substantive submission on these issues, 
observations can be made that help identify some key threads relevant to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The SEC has had some notable struggles in this regard, for example, the SEC’s proxy access Rule 
14a-11, successfully challenged in court – see Business Roundtable And Chamber Of Commerce Of 
The United States Of America v. SEC, United States Court of Appeals, For The District Of Columbia 
Circuit, Decided July 22, 2011, No. 10-1305  
63 HKEX “Concept paper. New Board” June 2017 
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process of reform. These threads can alternatively be read as problems in listing 
reform to date that are in need of better management. 
 
3.1 Whether regulatory architecture is the correct starting point 
 
The fundamental question that has resurfaced following the Consultation Paper is 
whether the DRM works or should be replaced by a listing authority embedded 
within the SFC. The discussion of the merits or otherwise of such a change is a far 
reaching one that contemplates a fundamental change to regulatory architecture. 
Any comparison with the experiences in other markets would need to be 
significantly updated since the 2003 Experts Report in order to establish whether 
such a change would bring any benefit to Hong Kong. This is essential given the 
developments in the Hong Kong market since that time, which includes the 
composition of listed issuers as well as the body of case law developing in tandem 
with the SFC’s role as a corporate enforcer. It also requires a consideration of 
those matters that have remained essentially unchanged, such as shareholder 
rights. In the absence of such a review, calls for a listing authority appear 
premature - it is far from certain whether such an alternative model would have 
worked better than the current model under which Hong Kong has enjoyed a 
considerable measure of prosperity. Calls for a fundamental change in regulatory 
architecture possibly also serve as a distraction from identifying other 
mechanisms that could work to stimulate change from within the DRM. In short, 
insofar as a change to regulatory architecture is not a currently implementable 
solution, its relevance to the present issues may be limited. Moreover, a change 
to regulatory architecture necessarily requires the involvement of the Legislature, 
and this is discussed in section 3.4 below. 
 
3.2 “Order dependence” and the strategic objectives for the capital market 
 
The present listing reform issues do not themselves represent underlying 
strategic objectives for the long term development of Hong Kong’s capital market. 
The HKEX’s Concept Paper is a case in point. Competition from other markets, 
particularly New York, for new listings is a central concern and in effect positions 
Hong Kong’s continued success in terms of competing in relation to pre-profit 
companies, companies with WVR structures, and Mainland companies listed 
elsewhere.64 However, markets also compete on a range of other issues, such as 
the transparency, efficiency and predictability of the listing process. They also 
compete on the costs and potential liability of being listed in a particular venue, 
for example, while the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may have 
helped improve investor confidence, it also sufficiently increased liability and 
compliance costs for listed companies to create a competitive disadvantage.65 So 
the first question is, on what items should Hong Kong choose to compete? 
 
Size does matter – permitting WVR structures and pre profit companies to list 
would facilitate that – but simply increasing the traded size of a market size 
patently is not synonymous with market development. The substantive proposals 
of the Concept Paper serve to draw the listing reform debate toward its specific 
details, on which opinion goes both ways. Is the New Board just another GEM-in-
waiting? Are the purposes sought to be achieved by the New Board better sought 
through the existing Main Board? Are professional investors investing in WVR 
adequately protected? Does the abandonment of the one-share-one-vote 
principle (OSOV) in one part of the market represent the start of a slippery slope 
into which other parts of the market will eventually slide?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Concept Paper section 2.3 
65 It also led to an increase in the number of companies delisting (from 48 in 2003 to 80 in 2004) and 
a significant decrease in the number of foreign issuers coming to the U.S. market as the venue for a 
listing 
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These specific concerns in fact touch on a number of interconnecting issues that, 
it is suggested, are more properly issues for consideration in relation to strategic 
market development, such as the following:  
 
Would the New Board promote an increased participation of international 
institutional shareholders that would bring a wider set of benefits to the Hong 
Kong market?66 If so, how? Is the New Board the only alternative to achieve this? 
Is WVR the only means by which this can be achieved? What are the alternatives? 
And, if one does lean in the direction of accepting WVR structures, is it necessary 
to consider what alternative protections are available following the removal of 
OSOV upon which the present system is based? Does it imply that the Law 
Commission’s 2012 proposals to introduce class action rights (CAR) 67 must be 
reinvigorated? Would the SFC’s role as an enforcer of collective interests be 
adequate in the absence of developing CAR?68 If not, what alternative protections 
are available? Will WVR present further challenges to maintaining good corporate 
governance standards in the public market? If the market is limited to 
professional investors, should the SFC’s powers under the SMLR be repositioned 
to let the market decide? Does or should this represent a shift away from Hong 
Kong’s hybrid disclosure plus merit-based regulation toward a more purely 
disclosure-based regulation? If so, is Hong Kong’s overall system of laws and 
regulatory protections ready for a more purely disclosure-based system? And if 
institutional investors do not develop in response to permitting WVR, are 
shareholders exposed to a market that may suffer from inadequate value-testing 
and research facilities? 
 
Clarity is needed to understand whether such interconnected questions precede 
and lead the debate on listing reform, or whether they are led by and follow a 
debate that is primarily driven by extrinsic factors – this relationship might be 
termed “Order Dependence”.  
 
The discussion around WVR serves as a useful illustration of Order Dependence. 
It is notable that in the extensive discussions about WVR that have taken place 
over the last 4 years69 there has been little or no reflection on why stock 
exchanges in the United States permit WVR structures. Contrary to what appears 
to be a commonly held given, WVR structures did not arise because of a 
disclosure based system that was protected by CAR,70 nor was it due to any 
special characteristics of tech companies. While WVR structures had been popular 
in the relatively unregulated era of the 1920s, following the Depression OSOV 
was restored. WVR again emerged in the 1980s as companies sought to make 
themselves takeover proof. The NYSE71  only abandoned OSOV following the 
threat by General Motors in 1984, a highly significant company at the time, that it 
would move to Nasdaq if NYSE did not acquiesce to its request.72 Nasdaq and the 
American Exchange, both of which represented a growing competitive threat to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 As discussed in section 2 above 
67 “Report – Class Actions, (May 2012)” The Law Commission of Hong Kong. The proposal has 
effectively been set aside by the Department of Justice and the HKSAR Government and is no longer 
listed by the Law Reform Commission as a current project (per its website www.hkreform.gov.hk, as 
of August 2017). 
68 S Johnstone “A flawed debate”, International Financial Law Review, May 2015, 38-39. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811028 
69 Primarily following the rejection in 2013 of Alibaba’s proposed WVR-structure listing. 
70 While most CAR actions do arise in respect of disclosure problems or fraud (see “Securities Class 
Acting Filings 2013 Year in Review”, Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse, at page 7) an abuse of power involving a breach of of fiduciary duty to 
the company is primarily a matter for a derivative action taken on behalf of the company 
71 The New York Stock Exchange 
72 GM planned to issue a second class of shares with one-half vote per share 
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the NYSE at the time, did permit WVR.73 Bowing to commercial pressure, the 
NYSE sought the SEC’s approval to relax its own OSOV listing requirement – in 
response, the SEC in 1988 adopted Rule 19c-4, a “Disenfranchisement Rule”74 
that prevented WVR structures. However, the rule was successfully challenged in 
court 75  and has since been replaced with a provision that merely prevents 
conversions from OSOV to WVR structures.76  
 
Several lessons can be learned from the foregoing. First, that the SFC’s concerns 
about WVR has in fact already been played out in the field by the SEC. Second, 
there was a failure of legality: the SEC’s 1988 rule was ultra vires.77 Third, and 
importantly for the purposes of illustrating Order Dependence, the fundamental 
dynamic that drove the WVR issue was essentially a tug-of-war between private 
interests78 and a public market policy in which the former dominated the latter. 
The implication of the relationship between private and public interests shall be 
returned to below. Finally, it should be asked, as an empirical matter, to what 
extent did the NYSE’s adoption of WVR contribute to its continued success. 
 
Clearly there are developmental objectives beyond competitiveness. In this 
respect, perhaps the most important relates to the ability of Hong Kong’s markets 
to provide necessary channels for raising capital to support the development of 
innovation and the real economy, here and elsewhere.  
 
3.3 Process of undertaking listing reform 
 
It has already been noted above that development requires some form of 
consensus between stakeholders. This first requires the identification of the 
relevant stakeholders. While this may seem obvious, even trite, it should not be 
underestimated. For example, it was surprising that the preparation of the 
Consultation Paper did not involve consultation with the LC. This led to both the 
LC as a body, as well as a group of members from within the LC, issuing differing 
views on the viability of the proposals.79 Given the LC’s important role in the 
listing process, it would have seemed reasonable, if not highly desirable, to seek 
access to its expertise, not least because the LC’s functionality was a subject of 
the Consultation Proposal. Moreover, the voices of its members do carry influence 
in the financial community. Failing to include relevant stakeholders may run 
counter to the idea of engagement with the market and can lead to failures to 
take an adequate sweep of attendant concerns and put potential collaborators 
off-side. Involvement is no guarantee of agreement, but it does run a higher 
possibility of paring down proposals to what can be accepted and work.  
 
Putting aside the influence of dominant economic entities has in the past been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Including no-vote shares (as recently seen in the Snap IPO). See W Bratton “Let dual-class 
companies list abroad” in “Dual-class stock: Governance at the edge”, Shareholder Value, Third 
Quarter, 43. (2012) 
74 7 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988). Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed.Reg. 
26,376, 26,394 (1988) 
75 The Business Roundtable, Petitioner, v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Grant M. 
Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and The False Promise of Homogeneity, 30 Cardozo 
Law Review, 471. (2008) 
76 17 CFR 240.19c-4 (as amended 2005) 
77 The legal provisions relied on by the SEC did not provide it with the authority to make the rule. See 
the Business Roundtable case, op. cit. 
78 Although General Motors was a public listed company, its actions reflect the interests of a 
corporation pursuing its own objectives without regard to wider public market concerns 
79 Listing Committee submission 2016 (undated); submission by three Listing Committee members 
dated 16 November 2016 
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difficult.80 The difficulty of aligning different interests and the powers of the SFC 
and HKEX being constrained (as noted above) is in part why reform proposals 
have had a patch-like quality to them. Both the Consultation Paper and the 
Conclusions seek to develop the oversight of the listed market from within the 
narrow space for movement provided by the SFO and both present difficulties: it 
has not worked to align stakeholder interests, and it gives rise to legal cum 
regulatory problems that are important to get right. In the context of rule of law, 
any proposal that does not sit within the legal framework in effect serves as a 
distraction from and an obstruction to meaningful forward progression. It also 
runs the risk of leaving aspects of the system exposed and unsatisfactorily 
regulated, as the SEC had found with WVR. Patch-like bricolage also risks leaving 
the regulatory system looking unclear, uncertain as to its application and 
unpredictable, particularly when looked at from the perspective of a foreign issuer 
considering a listing on the Hong Kong market to access Chinese capital, as 
opposed to tapping another market for capital. 
 
The SFC’s recent engagement of its s. 6 SMLR powers may be a case in point. 
There is currently a division of opinion in the market as to whether it amounts to 
using the power in a manner beyond its original intent as a “reserve power”.81 In 
support of the SFC’s use of the power, it can be argued that if one puts aside the 
SFC’s “goalkeeper to playing-field” rhetoric, the power is, prima facie, in 
accordance with the intent of the legislative provisions insofar as a power does 
not cease to be reserve in nature simply because it is used more actively. On this 
basis, one might even choose to critique the SFC as to why it has not used it 
more actively in the past.  
 
The issue is really the qualitative employment of the s. 6 power and the extent to 
which it is consistent or at variance with the DRM/DFR. For example, objecting to 
a listing application based solely on the applicant’s prospects or sustainability 
would be a qualitatively different use. In contrast, it is less clear whether the 
SFC’s new process of writing directly to the sponsor directly with its queries 
instead of the long standing practice of providing them to the SEHK, is 
qualitatively different. While some may regard this as bypassing the SEHK’s role 
as the frontline regulator of listing applications and to that extent inconsistent 
with the DRM, given that the SEHK’s past practice was in general merely to 
photocopy and forward the SFC’s queries, this new process may be more 
emblematic than substantive.  
 
What is of greater significance under the SFC’s new approach is that its queries 
may be concerned not only with the contents of the draft prospectus but also 
directed to the sponsor to seek details of the due diligence steps it has 
undertaken. This is significant because, although sponsor work does have a 
bearing on the quality of disclosures, the SMLR is only concerned with the listing 
applicant, not the sponsor.82 Queries directed to the sponsor’s work undertaking 
therefore appear to go outside the scope of the SMLR’s concerns and are more 
properly explained as an exercise of the SFC’s mandate to supervise 
intermediaries (i.e. sponsors) under Part VIII SFO. One might ask what difference 
does it make, between which route the SFC uses to interrogate a sponsor’s work 
undertaking. In response it may be pointed out that regulatory clarity, 
particularly as regards the intended purposes of the DRM, is muddied. Any 
exercise of Part VIII powers is not a concern of the SEHK or the listing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Dominant economic entities continue to exert influence, over the past two decades the financial 
system is becoming increasingly rule based and transparent. See DW Arner at al, op. cit., para 2.20 
81 See section 2.1 above 
82 S. Johnstone, A Da Roza and N Davis, “Deconstructing sponsor prospectus liability” Hong Kong Law 
Journal, Vol 46(1) 2016, 255-285, 265. Abstract available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811000 
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applicant,83 and might invoke secrecy concerns.84 In contrast, queries under the 
DFR route brings focus to the listing applicant, which takes one back to the 
concern, noted in section 2.1 above, about the more veiled dangers to the market 
of suspecting the problem rests in the quality of the listing applicant. 
 
Where entrenched interests have stultified reform in a manner that neither the 
SFC nor the HKEX can resolve through stakeholder involvement, or where the 
efforts of regulatory agencies to work together within the existing framework 
have created problems or complexities of one sort or another, another 
mechanism of reform is available that amounts to direction. 
 
3.4 What is the appropriate mainspring of development   
 
In the absence of law reform, the listing reform debate has to date been primarily 
undertaken at the 2nd and 3rd tiers of Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture – the 
SFC and the HKEX. Originating and implementing development at these tiers of 
Hong Kong’s three-tier regulatory architecture is consistent with what was 
envisaged with the introduction of the SFO in 2003 and Hong Kong’s free market 
economy85 in which the top tier – the HKSAR Government – has maintained its 
historically adopted policy of “positive noninterventionism”.86  
 
The Government and its agencies established the essential framework of the 
reform debate via the three key initiatives identified in section 2 above. The 2nd 
and 3rd tier agencies have been circling these issues for over a decade without 
significant progress. Nor has there been progress in establishing new approaches 
to reform, for example, as regards agreeing the underlying strategic objectives of 
achieving market development87 and how best to pursue them. This has, over 
time, led to a growing concern that stalled progress, and the lack of a clear 
development pathway, may be impacting not only on the success of the market 
per se but also on the interests of the largest stakeholder group in the market, 
namely, Hong Kong’s wider social and economic interests. This requires a 
recognition at all three tiers that capital markets ultimately exist to serve the 
broader community and the economy, not merely the persons engaged in market 
activity on a daily basis. The Order Dependence of the listing reform debate is 
highly relevant to consider here - is it being driven by private interests (as was 
seen with WVR in the United States88) as opposed to public market policy 
development? If the foregoing considerations are causes for concern, one might 
query whether the 2nd and 3rd tier agencies (including stakeholders in these tiers) 
are best suited to undertake the reform task, and go on to suggest that 
development may require returning the task to the top tier, which is more 
properly concerned with the wider public interest. This would need to go beyond 
the FSTB89 and the FS90 as neither has any specific powers under the SFO in 
relation to listing reform. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The Part VIII route brings focus to the ongoing work of the sponsor indepently of any particular 
listing applicant, however, if the SFC took regulatory measures against the sponsor this might cause 
the sponsor to be unable to continue an active engagement for a listing applicant  
84 If the SFC is conducting a supervisory inspection under Part VIII this would normally be regarded as 
subject to s. 378 SFO 
85 Milton Friedman, “The real lesson of Hong Kong” (1997), Magazine of the University of Chicago 
Booth School of Business, Fall, and “Hong Kong wrong”, Wall Street Journal 6 October 2006 
86 A term coined by Sir Philip Haddon-Cave to describe the approach of John Cowperthwaite, the 
Financial Secretary of Hong Kong from 1961 to 1971 
87 Such as those discussed in section 3.2 above 
88 See section 3.2 above 
89 The FSTB reflects the Government’s “broad policy interest and concern in the development of Hong 
Kong’s financial markets as part of Hong Kong’s economy”. Robert G Kotewall and Gordon CK Kwong, 
“Report of the Panel of Inquiry on the Penny Stocks Incident,” (September 2002): available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/info/pennystock/reporte-full.pdf (visited 7 November 2016) para 3.4. 
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While a firmer top-down 1st tier policy direction may be beneficial, or even 
necessary, to move Hong Kong forward from a repeating cycle of issues, it 
ultimately remains a question of whether the social needs of Hong Kong are 
sufficient to warrant intervention by the Government. Such an intervention would 
appear necessary if the SFC and/or HKEX are insufficiently enabled to resolve the 
issues within the existing framework. As the HKEX itself noted in its 2005 
submission to the FSTB,91 it is the role of the Legislature to set out the main 
requirements that should govern the Hong Kong market. For example, when 
debating the question of reforming the Singapore Companies Act to permit public 
companies to adopt WVR structures, its Parliament was primarily concerned with 
the need to “maintain the relevance of Singapore as a financial hub and to 
maintain its competitiveness and attractiveness relative to its competitors.”92 This 
led to changes in the Companies Act;93 however, the corresponding listing reform 
remains under discussion. 
 
The foregoing considerations beg several questions: whether Hong Kong’s top-
tier is capable of conducting an in-depth, impartial review leading to proposals 
that are forward-looking and in line with the foreseeable direction and needs of 
the development of Hong Kong’s financial market; whether the Legislature and 
Government are capable of providing strategic vision and leadership; and, given 
some of the notable failures in the past,94 whether any such proposals could be 
implemented. 
 
Reflecting some of the above concerns, it is noteable that the newly established 
Financial Leaders Forum in its first meeting discussed the recent developments in 
the listing reform debate against the context of the future of Hong Kong’s listing 
platform.95 Whether it is time to seek from the Legislature greater clarity of 
direction that would serve to move the market forward ultimately rests on 
whether entrenched interests are willing to engage in meaningful consensus-
seeking within the 2nd and 3rd tiers. 
 
3.5 Three Propositions 
 
The objective of this section 3 being to identify some key underlying threads that 
may assist to reposition the debate on listing reform, the foregoing considerations 
might be distilled into three propositions with attendant questions, as follows. 
 
The Commercial Proposition: It is necessary to identify the strategic policy-
based objectives for market development as distinct from business cum economic 
pressures of an essentially private nature. Only then can these two sets of issues 
be properly assessed, reconciled and developed. 
 
Attendant questions: What metric should be used to assess the risks to 
different stakeholders in the listed market of engaging (or not engaging) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The FS has responsibility for legislation and policy on matters concerning the securities and futures 
market. The SFC is required to advise the FS on such matters per s. 5(1)(q) SFO (see also s.12 SFO) 
but this does not amount to a power in the hands of the FS 
91 op. cit. 
92 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Second Reading (Response) Speech on the Companies 
(Amendment) Bill, 8 October 2014 
93 The new section 64A if the Companies Act (cap. 50) allows public companies to issue shares of 
different classes 
94 For example the FS/FSTB consultations discussed in section 2 including in particular the 2003 
Expert Report, following which the FS had announced that a statutory listing authority would be 
established but subsequently recanted 
95 The first meeting was held on 30 Augist 2017. See 
http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categories/finance/html/2017/08/20170830_155550.lin.shtml 
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in a particular listing reform that gives precedence to one of the above two 
sets of issues? Which of the three tiers are capable of establishing a long 
term vision for market development? 
 
The Regulatory Proposition: Any proposed reform originating from the 2nd or 
3rd tiers must be consistent with powers given to regulatory agencies. Where 
those powers are inadequate to introduce reform considered necessary or 
desirable for market development, then it is necessary to go back to the law 
makers. 
 
Attendant questions: How should the SFC’s development mandate be 
executed, in particular, how should the protection of shareholders be  
balanced with the interests of all stakeholders in developing the public 
market?  At what junctures should one trump the other, and what is the 
correct agency to make that decision? 
 
The Consensus Proposition: There is ample scope for consensus building 
within the 2nd and 3rd tiers of Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture. However, if 
consensus fails to form leading to stagnation in market development, 
stakeholders in the 2nd and 3rd tiers must reconcile themselves to receiving 
direction from the top tier. 
 
Attendant question: At what tier of Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture 
are different types of reform question most appropriately undertaken 
where sufficient consensus fails to form? 
 
These three Propositions clearly are not themselves solutions to the current 
problems in listing reform. Rather, it is suggested that if stakeholders in the 
reform debate take these Propositions and attendant questions on board in 
earnest, there will be a greater possibility for moving forward together on listing 
reform.96 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 The authors would like to thank for their comments on an earlier draft Simon Harding and another 
anonymous reviewer; the views expressed and any errors remain those of the authors 
